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This paper contrasts the approaches of the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank to the management of the 
Hungarian financial crisis of 2008. It exposes normal behaviour of the IMF and 
the EU Commission and dysfunction on the part of the ECB, during the first 
liquidity trap phase of the global financial crisis. The methodology applied 
contrasts the IOs’ mandate with their framing of the Hungarian crisis as well as 
with their actual policy recommendations. It uncovers that the IMF negotiating 
team had a market focus, stressed the European and regional dimensions of the 
Hungarian crisis, and recommended large financial assistance. The 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
representatives focused on the budgetary imbalances and treated the crisis 
primarily as a Hungarian crisis, which has the potential of contaminating the 
whole EU. They provided moderate financial assistance. Finally, the ECB 
thought to combat contagion to the Eurozone by ignoring the European 
dimension of the Hungarian case. It was reluctant to provide significant 
assistance to an EU member state, whose banking sector is dominated by 
Eurozone banks. It concludes with a note on the possible negative consequences 
of the ECB’s action on the European Union’s integration. 
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1. Introduction 
In October 2008, two very different international organisations (IOs) teamed up to lessen the 
financial troubles of a European Union member state. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), an institution with relatively high autonomy1, the EU Commission, an institution 
bound by rules and committed to pre-defined procedures,2 have united their very different 
expertise. In the meantime, the European Central Bank (ECB) declared its intention to take 
care only of Eurozone countries. Hungary was the first EU member state who sought their 
assistance and thus became an experimental case for the three IOs to try out their skills in 
crisis management. 
In this essay, I show the different approaches of the IMF and the EU Commission in handling 
the Hungarian crisis and expose the ignorance of the ECB. Drawing on constructivist and 
institutionalist approaches to the study of IOs, I explore the relationship between the IOs’ 
policy recommendations and their institutional characteristics. The IMF negotiating team had 
a market focus and stressed the European and regional dimensions of the Hungarian crisis. 
The Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) 
representatives focused on the budgetary imbalances and treated the crisis primarily as a 
Hungarian crisis, which has the potential of contaminating the whole EU. Finally, the ECB 
thought to combat contagion to the Eurozone by ignoring the European dimension of the 
Hungarian case. It was reluctant to provide significant assistance to an EU member state, 
whose banking sector is largely dominated by Eurozone banks. 
I argue that the IMF’s and the Commission’s handling of the crisis represent the normal 
behaviour of IOs, while the ECB’s misconception and ignorance is a case of dysfunctional 
behaviour on the part of an IO. I build on Barnett and Finnemore3 to argue that IOs are 
bureaucratic organisations which create and disseminate social knowledge of their 
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environment. They ‘create actors, specify responsibilities and authority among them, and 
define the work these actors should do, giving it meaning and normative value.’4 However, 
these processes may make IOs ‘unresponsive to their environments, obsessed with their own 
rules at the expense of primary missions, and ultimately lead to inefficient, self-defeating 
behaviour.’5 Using Barnett and Finnemore’s insights, I contrast the three IOs’ policy 
recommendations – which I show to follow from their past experiences and institutional 
organisations – with their mandates in order to uncover normal and dysfunctional behaviours. 
The ECB’s understanding of the member states’ crises as isolated incidents changed only very 
slowly in the course of the Eurozone crisis. For example, its concern with the whole 
Eurozone, and insistence that the Greek troubles are to be solved by Greece alone, made it 
blind to the fact that Greece’s troubles originated in the functioning of the Eurozone as a 
whole6. Similarly, the same misconception of the crisis prevented European authorities from 
promptly proposing adequate solutions to the crisis. As Véron7 demonstrated, it was in the 
European Department of the IMF where the idea of the Banking Union was originally 
proposed with earnest. Even when change finally occurred, as Mochella8 identified, it was 
only to save the status quo and the ECB’s preferences. In the end, the ECB’s attitude during 
the crisis contributed to the emergence of a situation opposite to the mandate of the ECB, 
which is to foster integration of the whole EU. This is why, following Barnett and 
Finnemore,9  I call its operation during the Hungarian financial crisis an example of an 
institutional dysfunction.  
During the course of this research, I consulted secondary documents, policy briefs, as well as 
the IMF’s and the EU Commission’s own assessments of their involvement in the Hungarian 
crisis. I also made semi-structured interviews with both Hungarian officials (high ranking and 
lower ranking) from the government, the central bank as well as the IOs’ own representatives. 
The interviewees preferred to stay anonymous. 
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The paper is structured as follows. First, I review the literature that analyses IOs’ involvement 
in the European financial crisis. I show that most analyses of the ECB, almost exclusively 
consider its role within the Eurozone; the negative impact of its action on Central and Eastern 
European countries is rarely exposed. In the next step, I turn to the Hungarian case and 
present an assessment of pre-crisis risk factors. I proceed to first review the involvement of 
the IMF, followed by the Commission’s DG ECFIN, and finally, the ECB. The last section 
concludes.  
2. IOs’ involvement in the European financial crisis  
Almost ten years on, IOs’ involvement into the global financial crisis has been studied from a 
number of perspectives. The IMF’s role has been at the forefront of international political 
economy analyses. Researchers showed for example that contrary to popular perceptions the 
IMF is responsive to governments’ electoral concerns10and that the IMF is able to change its 
policy recommendations. 11 Others looked at the challenges of global governance and 
examined the role of the IMF in it,12 or argued that the IMF is still under the influence of the 
G5 countries.13  
The role of the EU in the crisis has been studied mainly from a European integration 
perspective.14 In most work, the EU institutions are lumped together and their joint 
performance is assessed. One exception to this trend is the assessment of the European 
Central Bank’s performance. However, an important feature unites most of these assessments; 
namely, that they almost exclusively look at the impact of the ECB’s activities within the 
Eurozone – the financial sector of aspirant countries or non-Eurozone countries are usually 
neglected.  
For instance, from a neofunctionalist perspective Chang15 argues that the ECB is the winner 
of the financial crisis as it was able to significantly enlarge its mandate by taking on new roles 
such as lender of last resort for banks and indirectly to sovereigns, the role of financial 
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supervisor through the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and the role of government advisor. 
Saraceno, although critical of the ECB’s and especially EU policy makers performance during 
the crisis, neglecting the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, notes that the ECB’s 
performance in the first ‘liquidity trap’ phase of the crisis was ‘bold, coordinated, and overall 
successful.’16 His overall criticism, that the crisis has highlighted a neglect of financial 
stability as an objective of monetary policy, has, however, implications beyond the Eurozone. 
Jacoby 17 explicitly looks at the EU’s performance in Central and Eastern Europe before and 
after the 2008 crisis. He observes that the Commission and the Council, although modestly, 
but still contributed to the lessening of the impact of the crisis in CEE through providing 
access to the Balance of Payments facility as well as through easing access to structural funds. 
Turning to liquidity provision, he is more critical of the ECB’s performance: ‘policies here 
appear tentative, improvised and late. There  was  also  a  divide  between  Eurozone states,  
who  had  access  to  ECB  instruments,  and  non-Eurozone  states,  who  received essentially 
no help from the ECB.’18  
Lütz and Kranke19’s analysis is a significant piece of research that contrasts the EU’s and 
IMF’s responses to the crisis in the CEE region. They demonstrate that in negotiations with 
Romania and Latvia in 2009, the IMF negotiating team proved to be far more flexible, and 
embracing relatively less orthodox fiscal policy recommendations, than representatives of the 
Commission and the ECB. The authors argue that state-centric explanations of IOs’ behaviour 
cannot explain the differences. This is because the US proved to be disinterested in informing 
the IMF’s lending conditionalities and instead let European Union member states dominate 
the decisions of the IMF’s Executive Board.20 Under this condition, then, it is hard to 
understand either from a realist or a liberal state-centric perspective why the same European 
states would have preferred different policy recommendations. Instead, the authors argue, in 
order to understand the differences we have to look inside the two IOs to examine how they 
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‘processed’ the same preferences differently.21 Drawing on a rich constructivist scholarship 
which treats IOs as bureaucracies ,22 they argue that one must look at the organisations’ 
mandate and the various ways in which staff within these organisations reinterprets these 
mandates. During the 2008 financial crisis, they found that the IMF staff reinterpreted their 
technical mandate broadly, while the EU representatives upheld many of the orthodoxies of 
the Washington Consensus. 
In this paper, I build on the findings of Lütz and Kranke,23 but also advance their argument. 
Looking at the Hungarian financial crisis,  which preceded the Romanian and Latvian crises, I 
argue that to have a more comprehensive understanding of IOs’ behaviour, it is not enough to 
explore how they interpret their mandate, but it is equally important to understand their 
interpretation of the crisis situation within which they found themselves. ‘Seeing like an IO’, 
Broome and Seadbrooke argue, ‘provides insights into how they make their member states 
‘legible’ and how greater legibility enables them to construct cognitive authority in specific 
policy areas.’ 24  More importantly, investigating what an IO saw into a situation – how it 
framed the crisis – allows us to open up categories of crisis management that Lütz and 
Kranke25 cautiously avoided. At the end of their analysis, they write that ‘Our preceding 
empirical overview shall not be read as suggesting that either the IMF’s or the EU’s 
preferences were more economically sensible.’26 However, if we look at IOs’ reading of the 
crisis as well, and find that there were major differences in interpretations, then we will be in 
a position to distinguishing between normal and pathological crisis managements. In the case 
of the Hungarian crisis, the IMF’s market focus and the Commission’s fiscal imbalance focus, 
although represented very different understandings of the source of the crisis and the preferred 
ways to handle it, both took into consideration the European dimension of the Hungarian case. 
I argue that the ECB’s framing of the Hungarian crisis as something to be ignored, and the 
subsequent denial of swap assistance to the Hungarian authorities as well as direct liquidity 
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sources to the Hungarian subsidiaries of Eurozone mother banks represents a case of 
dysfunctional behaviour. 
Barnett and Finnemore27 point to two features of IOs that are both the source of their power, 
but may also become the source of their dysfunction. The first is the notion that because 
bureaucracies are organised around rules, routines, and standard operating procedures, in 
certain cases these rules may become goals in themselves: ‘Rules and routines may come to 
obscure overall missions and larger social goals.’28 The second source of dysfunction is that 
bureaucracies specialise, therefore they claim: ‘concentrated expertise and specialisation can 
(and perhaps must) limit bureaucrats' field of vision.’29 Barnett and Finnemore do not provide 
a scale of assessment for the degree of pathologic behaviour. However, when they identify 
empirically pathologic behaviour of an IO, it is in the case of complete failure with 
devastating consequences. The ECB’s performance during the 2008 Hungarian crisis - 
although had negative consequences for the recovery of the Hungarian economy - should not 
be judged as devastating. Therefore, this research will only concentrate on evaluating the 
possibility of dysfunction in the case of the ECB. 
In order to assess whether an IO’s team followed a normal behaviour or a dysfunctional one, 
according to Barnett and Finnemore30 we must assess their efforts against their institutional 
mandate. I argue that the most efficient methodology for this purpose is to review their 
assessment of the situation, analyze their policy recommendation and contrast their efforts 
against the other IOs involved. By doing so, we will be in the position to understand the 
knowledge they gathered of the Hungarian crisis, their own role within it, and their actions in 
the form of policy recommendations. In the end, we will be able to judge the sensibility of 
their actions in terms of their mandate. Table 1 summarizes the argument.  
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Table 1. The argument 
 IMF EU Commission ECB 
Mandate assist troubled 
member states 
assist troubled 
member state 
as a member of 
ESCB – assist 
troubled member 
states 
Framing of the 
Hungarian crisis 
Financial market 
perspective 
Fiscal imbalance  
perspective 
Non-member’s crisis 
Policy 
recommendations 
Large financial 
assistance is needed 
Financial assistance 
is needed 
Best if ignored 
IO’s performance Normal Normal Dysfunctional 
 
3. Pre-crisis risk factors in Hungary 
The banking sector in Hungary has been dominated by Western European mother banks since 
1995. In 2008, the largest banks included Erste Bank, Raiffeisen Bank, UniCredit Bank, 
Intesa Sanpaolo, BLB, Volksbank, GE Capital, KBC Bank. There were only a few Hungarian 
controlled banks: OTP, FHB and the cooperative sector. In preparation for the 2004 EU 
accession capital flows were fully liberalized in 2001. Successive governments – although 
only moderately enthusiastically - have been preparing for Euro introduction ever since 
accession. 31 Crisis hit Hungary in the midst of a political turmoil, through the government 
bond markets and through the banking sector’s Achilles heel: its loan structure. In the 
following, I present banking sector developments, macroeconomic conditions and political 
processes prior to the crisis. 
Since 2000, retail credit expansion became the motor of banks’ growth. As the growth of 
deposits was lagging behind, banks’ external exposure (especially in the interbank markets) 
increased dramatically: the deposit to credit ratio achieved 170 per cent in 2008.32 Even 
though credit to GDP ratio remained lower than in Western Europe, rapid credit growth  
became increasingly worrisome.33 Starting from 2006, long term credit was increasingly 
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financed through short term funds, especially foreign exchange (FX) positions. Thus, the 
process of credit expansion went hand in hand with a change in the banks’ funding structure.  
The Hungarian economy’s current account remained relatively in balance due to the increased 
inflow of capital.34 The early 2000’s liquidity richness of the international capital markets also 
increased capital flow to Hungary. The massive inflow of credit was directed to the housing 
market, triggering a construction and housing boom.35 The housing boom, however, never 
developed into a housing bubble according to the analysis of the central bank.36 The housing 
loan expansion that developed in Hungary was in a number of aspects similar to the US sub-
prime mortgage boom:37 it was partly the result of a number of macroeconomic conditions, 
partly the result of competition in the banking sector, and partly the result of political factors.  
Foreign currency inflow elevated the value of local currency to a higher level that could have 
been justified by the performance the real economy. Arguably, the central bank’s interest rate 
policy was also not adequate to handle this situation. Second, inflation rate also accelerated 
and increased assets values. This development also put a pressure on the interest rate, 
increasing it to a level that made foreign currency denominated credit a lot more attractive 
than local currency ones. The government’s plan to join the Euro also contributed to this 
process. Most of the loans were denominated in Swiss franc, which offered better rates than 
Euro denominated ones. Finally, the growth of foreign currency denominated loans further 
increased the value of forint, making it ever more difficult to recognize the risks built in the 
exchange rate. 38 
The credit expansion presented excellent profit making opportunity for all banks. Due to the 
lower level of competition and financial culture, high level of trust in the value of forint and 
the high local interest rates, mother banks could charge higher interest rate margins in CEE 
than in Western Europe. Mortgage loans became the preferred instruments of banks as well as 
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equity loans. Importantly, the conditions of credit provisions gradually loosened: down 
payments diminished, maturities lengthened, and income check loosened.  
Government supported loan programmes also contributed to the credit expansion. From 2002 
to 2006 public debt again started to rise from 56 per cent to 66 per cent of GDP, due to the 
Medgyessy led Socialist-Szdsz government’s fiscal programme, which brought less 
popularity than expected but put very strong pressure on the budget. Fearing that the 
diminishing popularity of Medgyessy will eventually result in losing the next parliamentary 
elections, the Socialist party replaced him with Ferenc Gyurcsány as the Prime Minister in 
2004.39   
Gyurcsány’s government, similarly to the American government, embraced credit expansion 
as a substitute to government sponsored welfare spending and thus effectively contributed to 
the conversion of public debt to private debt. 40 The Gyurcsány government profited from the 
unregulated credit expansion in two ways: through the economization of welfare spending as 
well as through the inflow of value added taxes that increased due to increased consumption 
spending. A corollary effect of this public policy is, however, that market actors both on the 
demand and supply side of FX denominated credit market became less risk averse.  
In September 2006 an audio recording was leaked in which Gyurcsány admitted that the 
Socialists had been lying to the public about the economy for nearly two years.41 A month of 
demonstrations and atrocities followed. From this point onward, Gyurcsány could never 
regain his former popularity. Between the period of the 2006 atrocities and 2008 October 
when the financial crisis hit Hungary, the Gyurcsány government cautiously led a 
retrenchment of the welfare state reform programme, cutting back public employment and tax 
hikes. Key elements of the programme were, however, ousted by a hugely successful 
referendum led by Fidesz in early 2008, which led to enough friction in the coalition that 
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Szdsz decided to leave the coalition in April 2008. From May 2008 the Socialist Gyurcsány 
led a minority government with minimal room for manoeuvring in its economic policy.  
Prior to the crisis, the central bank was also slow to react to the mounting pressure and let its 
FX reserves deplete. The central bank only started increasing FX reserves in summer of 2008. 
Therefore, in October 2008 the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves level did not reach 
the renewable part of the fiscal deficit and that of the FX denominated private debt, thus 
increasing the country’s vulnerability.42   
4. The IMF - Advocate of the financial markets  
By October 2008, the IMF had already completed a major overhaul of its modus operandi 
initiated nearly a decade before. After the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Russian 
financial crisis in 1998, it had been severely criticised for applying a standardised formula of 
economic orthodoxy that located the sources of the crisis in the domestic economy and 
prescribed solutions that demanded the restructuring of domestic economy which proved 
utterly inefficient. 43 As a response to criticism, the IMF underwent major internal changes, it 
learnt to appreciate local economic and political circumstances, put a special emphasis on 
local political ownership of the programmes that it accepted and was at the beginning of 
launching even more overarching changes. The IMF’s mandate – however – has not changed: 
The Fund is a global credit union, whose purpose is to maintain stability of international 
finance by providing support to member states with adequate safeguards. 44 
The IMF staff had approached the Hungarian crisis situation from the vantage point of 
financial market actors. They ‘flattened reality’, i.e. excluded complexities, in a way to make 
the Hungarian case make sense for any imaginary financial market actor. The IMF team 
arrived at Hungary from the Marek Belka led European Department. They were all trained 
economists, experienced in other missions (although mainly Article IV reviews), and none of 
them spoke Hungarian.  
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During the first few days of their operation speculative attacks were launched not only against 
the forint, but also the largest and domestically owned Hungarian bank, OTP45. Trading on the 
stock exchange was suspended and the interbank market stopped functioning. The Hungarian 
government had short term maturity debt obligations of about EUR 3 billion, which if not 
fulfilled, was projected to force Hungary to default in December. However, domestic banks 
owed an even greater amount of short term obligations to foreign sources, which, due to the 
freeze of the interbank market, could not have been repaid on schedule. Foreign exchange 
reserves in the central bank stood at around EUR 17,4 billion, insufficient to cover all these 
obligations.46   
In light of the ‘market actor’s perspective’ framing of the Hungarian crisis, the IMF 
negotiating team as a first step convinced the Hungarian authorities that they are in need of a 
far greater amount of assistance than originally envisioned. The Hungarian authorities’ 
assessment was that they face a budgetary problem and calculated that they are in need of 
EUR 3 billion to finance their foreign obligations. The IMF team made it rapidly clear, that in 
their understanding, Hungary is in a far worse situation; the biggest threat is not that they 
cannot renew their public debt, but that they cannot cover the outstanding obligations of the 
banking sector. Therefore, they recommended that Hungary contract for EUR 20 billion 
(interviewee)47.  
Second, the IMF team stressed the importance of safeguarding nationally controlled banks 
and demanded commitment from foreign owned banks.48 The IMF team saw a major 
difference between the foreign owned and domestically controlled banks’ access to foreign 
currency denominated funding. Therefore, they insisted that part of the credit they provide 
must be used to support systemically important domestic banks to buttress their credibility. 
They also demanded a letter of commitment to keep liquidity positions from each foreign 
owned bank. Commitments, however, were not binding.   
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Third, reflecting the latest research of the IMF’s own research department, the team insisted 
on enclosing new bank regulations addressing macroprudential concerns into the agreement. 
A number of these regulations were proposed by the central bank authorities taking advantage 
of the golden opportunity. Others were much later implemented, not necessarily as 
macroprudential tools, but mainly as regulatory measures that increase the power of the 
government over the banks.49 Fourth, in relation to the fiscal imbalance the IMF expertise was 
important in defining the macroeconomic models used to forecast future fiscal imbalances. 
However, the team was not interested in defining the exact steps through which the Hungarian 
policy makers were to achieve the set targets. In addition, the team welcomed the Hungarian 
officials’ proposal of including into the programme the establishment of a Fiscal Council that 
would be able to supervise the long term sustainability of future budget proposals.  
Finally, the IMF did not put emphasis on safeguarding the poor or including socially sensitive 
measures as the interviewees unanimously attested. The measures that may be conceptualized 
as socially sensitive were initiated by local politicians and included a promise to give priority 
to investment projects (co-financed by EU funds) designed to support small and medium-
sized enterprises. In addition, a promise was put in place for a private debt resolution strategy 
that would alleviate the burden of households indebted with foreign currency loans50. The 
IMF team also reached out to opposition political parties, to ensure support of the programme.  
In conclusion, I showed that the IMF team acted in accordance with its mandate providing 
financial assistance to one of its member states in balance of payment difficulty. As a 
bureaucratic organisation it framed the crisis in accordance with its institutional background 
and past experience and negotiated accordingly. First, the Hungarian crisis was understood as 
having the potential to harm not only Hungary but also Europe and major financial assistance 
was the key to prevent it. Contagion was to be prevented through a strengthening of financial 
sector balance sheets and improving financial market conditions, therefore these became the 
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team’s main objectives. According to the IMF’s 2011 evaluating report ‘A crisis in Hungary 
could have resulted in significant losses at foreign parent banks, with significant risks of 
contagion to the Euro area and in turn to the rest of the CESE region.’51 
Second, Hungarian financial troubles were understood not to originate from the domestic 
economy itself, but from its high exposition to external factors. And these external factors, i.e. 
the dry up of liquidity on the international financial markets, were seen as the main reason for 
Hungary’s problems. Therefore, the IMF team focused more on the banks and less on the 
fiscal imbalance. This becomes evident if we investigate the fiscal component of the 
programme. Although the fiscal consolidation efforts under the programme were sizable 
(originally projected at 5 percent of potential GDP for 2009–11), it did not demand any major 
structural changes - neither in the financial sector nor in the economy. The large redistribution 
mechanisms were left intact; it did not change the structure of public administration or local 
governance, or transform universal social entitlements to a need based one. In sum, the IMF 
followed its mandate to safeguard balance in the international financial markets and thus 
performed normal IO behaviour. 
5. The Commission – Guardian of the fiscal balance 
The Commission’s involvement in the financial crisis management of an EU member state 
differed starkly from the everyday operation of this IO. Unlike the IMF, which is an 
organisation created to manage financial crisis and its staff experienced in it, the EU 
Commission was primarily created to manage the everyday operation of the EU and therefore 
very much unprepared for crisis management. The Commission mandate is defined by the 
Treaty on the European Union: ‘the Commission shall promote the general interest of the 
Union’ (Art. 17(1)) as laid down in Art. 17(1–2): by applying EU law in general and its 
treaties in particular…;administering the EU budget and representing the EU in its external 
relations (unless stipulated otherwise); and proposing legislative acts.’52  
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The negotiating staff assigned to Hungary came from a number of DGs, and although no 
formal mission head was named, the delegation was headed by the representative of the 
country group department where Hungary belongs of DG ECFIN. In 2008, the majority of 
analyses and background documents for the negotiating team were prepared by a team of 
economists, which included a few Hungarian nationals. According to their own assessment, in 
2008 the Commission was unprepared to manage the financial crisis both in terms of its staff 
as well as its procedural preparedness (interviewee). This is why, most of the negotiations 
with Hungarian officials were led by the IMF mission team and the EU officials only 
seconded the agreements reached.   
The mission staff’s defining past experience with Hungary stems from their involvement in 
the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). The EDP was triggered in 2004 and was still in effect 
in 2008. In the framework of the EDP, commissioners are required to pay attention to 
budgetary developments of the member state and if necessary define recommendations for its 
government. The invocation of the Balance of Payments facility also enhanced the fiscal 
orientation of the team. Thus, the negotiating team’s aim was ‘to help the country to build a 
prudent, stability-oriented and sustainable economic policy by supporting the sustainability of 
Hungary’s balance of payments.’53 In 2008, a general understanding in the EU Commission 
held that Hungary could have avoided this crisis, if it had followed a more austere fiscal 
policy in the past, reached the Maastricht criteria and joined the European Monetary Union.  
The Commission regarded the IMF as having superior experience in managing financial 
sector related policy issues, while themselves as having an advantage in their knowledge of 
the country’s economy. They felt that their familiarity with Hungary’s past fiscal policy, as 
well as actually being able to read the whole proposed budget, not only the English summary 
as the IMF, they could contribute to the joint programme by stressing its fiscal aspect. This 
became especially evident in the second and third reviews of the Hungarian programme in 
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February and May 2009, when it was the Commission that proposed stricter terms than the 
IMF (pension reform). Also, the Commission delegates’ negotiation mandate required them to 
include a medium term deficit target into any agreement they signed with the Hungarian 
authorities. The IMF mission team had no such restrictions. During the 2009 negotiations the 
EU Commission team was mandated to agree upon fiscal targets (3 per cent deficit) for 2010 
and also 2011, which obviously made negotiations tenser with the Hungarian authorities. This 
evidence supports Lütz and Kranke’s findings that the EU representatives rescued many of the 
aspects of the Washington Consensus. In addition, I found that this was the case not only 
because of their strictly rule following behaviour, but also because of their past experience 
and superior expertise in fiscal policy.  
To conclude, this analysis found the EU Commission adhered to its mandate during the 2008 
financial crisis: it supported the general interest of the Union by providing financial assistance 
of EUR 6.5 billion to a member state in trouble, and defined conditionalities that stemmed 
from its particularistic understanding of the crisis as having its origins in the member state’s 
past fiscal performance. Nevertheless, as for the magnitude of the EU’s financial assistance, 
Jacoby54 shows for comparison that Eurozone member Ireland, whose population is 4.5 
million compared to the roughly 10 million of Hungary, has received about EUR 45 billion in 
EU rescue packages.  
6. European Central Bank –Defender of the realm  
The European Central Bank’s mandate is derived from the Protocol (no 4) on the statute of 
the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. According to the 
Protocol (no 4) ’ the  primary  objective  of  the  ESCB  shall  be  to  maintain  price  
stability.’ With regards to financial stability mandate the Article 127 of TFEU55 (5) declares 
‘The ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent 
authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the 
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financial system.’ And specifically the ECB’s role is: ‘The ECB shall ensure that the tasks 
conferred upon the ESCB under Article 127(2), (3) and (5) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union are implemented either by its own activities pursuant to this Statute or 
through the national central banks pursuant to Articles 12.1 and 14.’  
There are two features of the ECB’s mandate that are interesting from the point of view of the 
argument. First, the ECB’s mandate of maintaining price stability is imprecise. The Treaty 
does not demand any specific level of inflation to be achieved; instead it gives relative 
freedom to the ECB staff to interpret its mandate. Second, the ECB is mandated – even if 
indirectly as a member of the ESCB – to contribute to the financial stability of the EU as a 
whole, not only to that of the Eurozone. Taken the two observations together, it becomes clear 
that in 2008 it was up to the ECB staff to decide and choose actions in relation to the 
Hungarian financial crisis.  
The ECB’s focus was on price stability of the Eurozone. As Trichet put it ‘Our policy is 
geared towards preserving price stability …, in so doing, supporting the conditions for 
enduring financial and economic stability.’56 It looked at the Hungarian cirri as an isolated 
incidence, which originated in the Hungarian domestic economy.  
In October 2008 crisis management in Hungary could not be delayed post the EU-IMF 
agreement. Already in October the Hungarian central bank was required to advance actions to 
sustain the stability of banking in Hungary. As a first step, central bank authorities contacted 
the ECB and asked for a swap option in order to activate a ‘swap lender of last resort’ 
function, i.e. a last resort function for foreign currency denominated instruments. Within the 
framework of this agreement the ECB provided EUR 5 billion.57  
There are a number of qualities, however, of this seemingly helpful arrangement. First, 
although the press communicated it as a swap deal, it was in fact a repo deal. The major 
difference between the two financial transactions is that for a swap option the drawing partner 
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has to pledge domestic funds, whereas for a repo transaction the drawing partner has to pledge 
foreign reserves. This meant concretely, that Hungarian authorities had to back the EUR 5 
billion with euro-denominated assets from the Hungarian central bank’s reserve. Providing 
these assets further decreased Hungarian - reserves that were insufficient to begin with - this 
is precisely why the Hungarian authorities turned to the IMF, the EU and the ECB for 
financial assistance.  The euro line provided by the ECB, in the end, could only be accessed 
with the help of the IMF-EU loan that Hungary contracted. 
Second, the ECB did provide euro swap options to the USA58, Switzerland59, Sweden60, and 
Denmark61 at the same time it denied the Hungarian62 authorities63 (as it denied the Latvian64 
and Polish65 central banks). Assessing their own actions, the ECB staff declared that the 
choice between swaps (to the USA, Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark) and repo (to 
Hungary, Latvia and Poland) was made ‘so as to minimise any impact on the ECB’s provision 
of euro liquidity and the ECB’s own monetary policy framework.’66 Considering the 
magnitude of financial trouble in the receiving country was not part of their assessment.  
Third, the ECB disregarded the negative consequences of its own actions for the Central and 
Eastern European government bond markets. As Neményi67 argues it accelerated the selloff of 
Hungarian and Polish government bonds, thus aggravating these governments’ public debt 
refinancing problems. Quite obviously, on liquidity dry government bond markets, who 
would invest in government bonds that not even the ECB accepts as collateral?  
The Hungarian banking sector could have acquired foreign currency much cheaper if the ECB 
had treated the European banks on consolidated basis – as one entity - and thus the Hungarian 
subsidiaries of the European banks could have also accessed the facilities opened by the ECB 
for Eurozone countries. During this period, the ECB injected a large amount of liquidity into 
European financial markets.68 For instance, the ECB opened unlimited liquidity provision at a 
fixed interest rate against adequate collateral; it lengthened the maturities of the longer-term 
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refinancing operations (LTROs); opened supplementary refinancing operations; introduced a 
Covered Bonds Purchase Programme of EUR 60bn69. Eurozone mother banks could in 
principle channel part of this liquidity to Hungary, but it was up to the mother banks to do so; 
they could in principle decide not to bring liquidity. External observers lack of assurance of 
the liquidity providing willingness of Eurozone mother banks to off-Eurozone area led the 
EBRD and the IMF to propose the Vienna Initiative in 2009, in which Eurozone mother banks 
pledged to keep their position prior to the crisis.70  
Hungarian controlled banks could not access ECB provided liquidity. This was the prime 
reason why the IMF insisted on a much larger loan as well as allocating part of the loan to 
Hungarian controlled banks. In other words, if the ECB had considered providing liquidity to 
Hungarian controlled banks, Hungary would have needed a smaller loan. This would have 
helped tremendously as part of the problem was that the Hungarian government’s public debt 
was already too large to finance from the dried up financial markets. The IMF-EU loan 
evidently increased Hungary’s outstanding debt obligation, and thus made its creditworthiness 
even worse.  
In October 2008, the Hungarian central bank entered the secondary market for Hungarian 
government bonds as a substantial buyer2. This action was not in harmony with European 
regulation – as it represents government financing - however, it was essential to revitalize the 
Hungarian government bond market.  Although in 2008 the ECB was very critical of these 
actions, it ended up taking similar measures not much later. In May 2010 the ECB launched 
the Securities Market Program (SMP) in which it purchased the sovereign debt of Eurozone 
countries such as Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy on secondary markets. This move 
caused  considerable indignation among  German central bankers as it could be construed as 
indirect government financing.71 Thus, in 2008 the Hungarian central bank’s actions were not 
                                                          
2
 Kiraly et al., “Contagion” 
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acceptable crisis measures in the ECB’s assessment, but in 2010 it was acceptable to do just 
the same when Eurozone member governments experienced a crisis situation.  
To conclude, during 2008 Hungarian financial crisis the ECB disregarded the interest and 
explicit request for swap assistance of the Hungarian authorities and Hungarian subsidiaries 
of Western European mother banks. Their interpretation of their mandate as guardian of the 
euro, made them insensitive to the magnitude of the Hungarian crisis and more importantly to 
the possible effects it may have on the financial stability of the Eurozone. The ECB staff 
prioritised its primary mandate regarding the Eurozone to the detriment of its financial 
stability mandate regarding the whole EU, not realizing the negative consequences for the 
integration of the European Union. Because the ECB acted against its explicit mandate, I 
define its actions as an institutional dysfunction. 
7. Conclusions 
Almost ten years on, there is growing evidence that the European Central Bank’s performance 
during the European financial crisis was less effective than what Europe needed. Although 
macroeconomic analysis generally found a satisfactory performance of IOs including the 
ECB, an increasing body of international political economy (IPE) research points out sharp 
differences among them, and is generally critical of the ECB’s performance.  In this research, 
I pointed out very sharply the differences among these three IOs in their understanding of the 
crisis as well as in their management of the crisis situation. The IMF team, led by a financial 
market focus, advocated large financial assistance, which is capable of deterring speculative 
attacks and thus preventing the contagion of the Hungarian crisis to Europe. The EU 
commission, led by a fiscal balance focus, provided Balance of Payment facilities to the 
Hungarian authorities to regain their budgetary balance.  At the same time, the ECB staff 
denied a swap option to the Hungarian central bank as well as access to liquidity by banks 
operating in Hungary.  
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Throughout this research, attention was paid on the IOs’ framing of the crisis in order to 
explain the content of the programme agreed upon with Hungarian authorities. Clearly, the 
programme was the result of negotiations with Hungarian officials and their views are also 
reflected in the end result. In this research, although some of the concerns and suggestions of 
the Hungarian officials are spelled out, they are not accounted for systematically. In addition, 
there is only scarce attention paid to the interaction between the IOs. This is the result of the 
observation that the IMF absolutely dominated the first phase of the programme and 
negotiations. In the ECOFIN meetings the ECB’s representatives never raised objections to 
the Commission’s efforts to manage the Hungarian crisis, but also did not contribute to it 
(interviewee).       
There are two implications of this research. First, the ECB, it seems, has a very narrow 
understanding of monetary stability in the European Monetary Union. It ignores labour 
market developments, industrial-relations, differences in productivities of member states, 
coordination efforts of governments, etc.  As pointed out by a number of political economists, 
these factors matter for monetary stability.72 In addition, as this research showed, it also 
disregards ‘facts of its own creation’ (for example the impact of not accepting as collateral 
Hungarian government bonds), and may undermine the stability of European financial 
markets in the process.  
Second, the ECB seems to have a tendency to loosen the European East-West integration 
process, instead of tightening it. Prior to the crisis, it showed reluctance to pressure CEE 
governments into euro-adoption.73 As this researched showed, its (in)actions during the 
‘liquidity phase’ of the European financial crisis clearly did not serve the larger purpose of 
tighter integration of the European Union. Even after the crisis, in the early versions of the 
Banking Union, it denied non-Eurozone governments supervisory powers and only changed it 
as a result of excessive criticism of CEE governments. Again, it seems there is a 
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counterintuitive side effect of the ECB’s focus on price stability of the Eurozone: its harmful 
consequence for European integration.   
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